

LEARNING LESSONS FROM DESIGN CASE STUDIES OF STEEL STRUCTURES

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29 March 2017







CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (COI, MAY 2005)

The collapse was rooted in two critical design errors:

1) Under-design of the diaphragm wall

This was associated with the use of the PLAXIS soil simulation model that over predicted the undrained shear strength of the clay.

2) Under-design of the strut-waler connection

Over-estimation of capacity based on BS5950 and splays omitted.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (COI, MAY 2005)

^cThese design errors resulted, in the event, in the failure of the 9th level strut-waler connections together with the inability of the overall temporary retaining wall system to resist the redistributed loads as the 9th level strutting failed. The catastrophic collapse then ensued.²









































Three(3) Rules for Good Practice in Structural Engineering

- <u>Rule No.1</u>
 Ductility can be forgiving of one's mistake
- <u>Rule No.2</u>
 Connection detailing is everything
 <u>Rule No.3</u>

Redundancies are our best defense against unexpected failure













































